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This article examines how economic shocks affect individual 
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shock affects individuals’ evaluations of well-being. This is 
done by using microlevel survey data, which—incidentally—
were collected in the days surrounding the devaluation. 
The chance occurrence of the devaluation during the time 
of the survey enables us to use pretreatment respondents, 
surveyed before the devaluation, as approximate coun-
terfactuals for post-treatment respondents, surveyed after 
the devaluation. Estimates show that the devaluation had 
a large and significantly negative effect on individuals’ 
evaluations of subjective well-being. These results suggest 
that macroeconomic shocks, such as unanticipated cur-
rency devaluations, may have significant short-term costs 
in the form of reductions in people’s sense of well-being.
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Few tasks are more important in the social sciences than discovering the sources of human well-
being. While this remains a contested issue (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Clark et al. 2008; Frey 2008; 
Bjørnskov et al. 2010; Deaton 2012), the question of whether “money buys happiness” attracts 
particular attention, no doubt because of the seemingly paradoxical finding—first reported by 
Easterlin (1974, 1995)—that income growth is not associated with corresponding increases in 
happiness and well-being (Clark et al. 2008; Easterlin et al. 2010). However, recent work has 
emphasized that subjective well-being does seem to fluctuate with banking and financial crises 
(Deaton 2012; Bjørnskov 2014; Montagnoli and Moro 2014) and macroeconomic factors like 
inflation, unemployment, and gross domestic product (GDP) (Oswald 1997; Di Tella et al. 2001, 
2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Kahneman and Deaton 2010; Sacks et al. 2012a), providing 
some support for the claim that income is correlated with happiness and well-being.   
In this article, we contribute to this literature by examining how macroeconomic shocks 
affect individual well-being. Using the case of an unanticipated and rapidly implemented currency 
devaluation in Botswana—a middle-income country in sub-Saharan Africa—we examine how 
individual evaluations of well-being respond to such a monetary policy shock. We do so by 
analyzing microlevel data from the Afrobarometer, which happened to be in the field conducting 
interviews for a survey at the time when the citizens of Botswana were exposed to the news of the 
national currency devaluation. Specifically, two days into the survey—late in the day on May 29, 
2005—the central bank of Botswana and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning issued 
a public statement saying that the national currency would be devaluated by 12 percent, with effect 
from the following morning.1 Our analysis exploits the fact that the chance occurrence of the 
devaluation creates a clear demarcation between respondents surveyed before the devaluation and 
respondents surveyed in the days following the devaluation.   
                                                 
1 Press Release, 17:00 hours, Sunday 29 May 2005, issued by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.  
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The incidental occurrence of the central bank’s intervention during the time of the survey 
provides us with a quasi-experimental research design allowing us to examine the effect of a 
monetary shock on subjective evaluations of well-being. However, the fact that the devaluation was 
an unanticipated shock—a claim we will validate later—is not sufficient to treat it as exogenous. 
Identification of the causal effect on subjective well-being requires that the devaluation—the 
treatment—is orthogonal to the error term, that is, uncorrelated with other factors that may affect 
the outcome. As we discuss in detail below, this assumption may not be satisfied unconditionally 
due to geographically imbalanced sampling of respondents in the pre- and post-treatment groups, 
caused by a shift in the sampling of respondents from urban to rural areas in the days surrounding 
the devaluation. However, since we can identify and measure the source of nonrandom treatment 
assignment with relative precision, the exogeneity of the devaluation is plausible conditional on 
adjusting for the urban-rural shift.  
On this assumption, our results show that the devaluation caused an instant and observable 
discontinuity in the data. The change in reported levels of well-being occurred literally overnight, 
reflecting that individuals’ responses were immediate and most likely based on expectations about 
the future consequences of the devaluation. Thus, respondents in the treatment group—surveyed 
after the devaluation—report levels of well-being that are both substantially and significantly lower 
than respondents in the control group—surveyed immediately before the devaluation. This result is 
robust to adjusting the data for nonrandom treatment assignment in various ways and to centering 
the sample on the discontinuity in the data created by central bank intervention. However, we also 
report evidence that respondents with more education and larger consumption of media news react 
more strongly to the policy shock, suggesting that the effect of monetary shocks may be conditional 
on individuals’ information and cognitive sophistication.  
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The article contributes to the broader literature on the determinants of individual happiness 
and well-being (Oswald 1997; Dolan et al. 2008; Frey 2008; Bjørnskov et al. 2010). It is also 
closely related to contributions linking macroeconomic variables like GDP and inflation to 
subjective well-being (Di Tella et al. 2001, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Deaton 2012). In 
particular, our results support the conclusion of Di Tella et al. (2003: 823) that “macroeconomics 
matters,” at least with respect to monetary shocks. However, the quasi-experimental nature of our 
design distinguishes it from standard correlational studies, which mostly regress well-being or life 
satisfaction on some potentially endogenous micro- or macrolevel explanatory variable. The “shock 
nature” of the currency devaluation allows us to avoid most of the problems caused by the usual 
endogeneity of macroeconomic and policy variables like GDP and inflation (Besley and Case 2000; 
Di Tella 2003). In this respect, our article adds to the small literature using large-scale exogenous 
shocks to study changes in subjective well-being (e.g., Frankenberg et al. 2003; Frijters et al. 2004; 
Montagnoli and Moro 2014). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines theoretical mechanisms 
linking currency devaluations to subjective well-being. The research design and the experimental 
situation are described in section 3. Section 4 introduces the data, and section 5 provides empirical 
estimates of the effects of the devaluation. Section 6 concludes.  
 
I. Devaluation and Subjective Well-Being 
The response of individuals to the news of a devaluation might depend on at least two different 
mechanisms—price responses and a signaling mechanism.  
 
Price Responses and Expectations 
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First, following a devaluation, the prices of imported consumer goods will increase. If contracts are 
written in foreign currency—in the case of Botswana most likely South African rand or US 
dollars—the price increase will be virtually immediate. If contracts are denoted in Botswana Pula, 
the price correction may occur gradually as import contracts are renegotiated over a period of weeks 
or months to reflect the new exchange rate. Depending on the price elasticity of the good, the 
degree of competition in the product market, and the availability of domestic substitutes—all of 
which would reduce the price response—some (or all) of the price increase will be reflected in 
proportionately increasing consumer prices. The devaluation thus makes imported goods more 
expensive and therefore reduces real wages for the population at large. Since Botswana is a net 
importer of food and other consumables like fuel and energy from, for example, South Africa 
(Rakotoarisao et al. 2011), the economic costs of the currency devaluation mainly accrued to 
consumers, at least in the short term.  
Second, the general price level is also likely to increase following a devaluation for two 
reasons associated with the price of domestically produced goods and services. One is that the 
devaluation affects final goods through its effect on import prices of raw materials and intermediate 
goods. By increasing input prices in production, the devaluation affects the prices of final goods 
that are produced domestically but relies on imported raw materials or intermediates. The second 
reason is that an import price increase is likely to cause an increase in the demand for domestically 
produced substitutes (or near-substitutes). As such pairs of goods tend to have substantial cross-
price elasticities, the price of substitutes is also likely to increase proportionally to the devaluation.  
These price effects are likely to affect individuals and households to approximately the same 
extent. However, household reactions to the shock can differ substantially, as documented by 
Frankenberg et al. (2003). In particular, one might expect that households directly engaged in the 
production of near-substitutes to imports may benefit in the medium-run, as demand patterns react 
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to the changing relative prices. Conversely, all households would be harmed by a general drop in 
aggregate demand and an increase in uncertainty, making it difficult from a theoretical angle to 
make any systematically heterogeneous predictions (see Montagnoli and Moro 2014). 
Although price increases may occur immediately following the news of a currency 
devaluation, they do not adjust fully or instantly to their new equilibrium. Subsequent changes in 
subjective well-being are therefore likely to at least partially reflect expectations about the future 
(Graham 2008; Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009; Sacks et al. 2012b). If prices of imported goods 
increase, price changes will take place almost instantly. Changes in economic expectations can 
therefore occur very rapidly given that individuals rely on consumption of imported final goods. If 
the general price level increases, the inflationary effects of the devaluation are likely to spread over 
time to most goods and services and lead to changes in expected and actual economic well-being for 
larger segments of society. However, the speed of adjustment of expectations is likely to depend on 
individuals’ economic and cognitive sophistication. If individuals have little information about the 
economy, their economic expectations are likely to adapt gradually as the consequences of the 
devaluation become observable in prices, real wages, and unemployment risk. In contrast, if 
individuals have sufficiently sophisticated mental models of the economy, a devaluation enables the 
formation of rational expectations (Muth 1961; Phelps 1967) that change rapidly after the news of 
the devaluation but presumably before the actual changes in absolute or relative prices. In this case, 
individuals with more sophisticated mental models of the economy will be better at foreseeing the 
consequences of devaluation and thus change their expectations earlier and more precisely. The 
extent to which people form and internalize expectations of how the economy is likely to develop in 
the longer run also depends on their cognitive sophistication, as well as information obtained from 
past experiences with similar policy shocks. 
 
7 
 
Signaling and Uncertainty 
Another type of mechanism may also affect individuals’ well-being. As stressed by Graham (2011), 
well-being is not only affected by individuals’ current status and expectations of the immediate 
future but also their perceived uncertainty. A devaluation announcement might therefore have two 
additional effects. 
First, relatively well-informed individuals are probably able to assess the direction of the price 
effects that we described above but may only have a vague idea about their magnitude. Policy 
changes with complex consequences, such as devaluations, may thus release a perceived demand 
for insurance of some kind, which in all forms must reduce current consumption possibilities. 
Whether this demand can be covered in actual insurance markets is questionable in middle-income 
countries. A likely consequence of a perceived and unanticipated increase in uncertainty is therefore 
likely to be an increase in either current savings or changed savings behavior in the near future. In 
either case, expected consumption and economic welfare is likely to decrease (Graham 2011). 
Second, the announcement of a devaluation can easily be taken as a signal that the economy 
moving in a direction that is inconsistent with individuals’ prior information. With limited 
information on the state of the domestic economy and less knowledge and information about that of 
major trading partners and the general world economy, governments’ policy decisions may work as 
signals of the direction of economic change. Changes such as devaluations can therefore be 
perceived as signals of future economic slowdown—particularly by more well-informed citizens—
that induce changes to expectations and financial plans. 
These nontechnical theoretical considerations lead us to expect the following: First, people’s 
evaluations of subjective well-being will on average decrease following a devaluation, all else 
equal. Second, however, since price effects may not materialize immediately and signals from 
government policy changes may be complex, we also expect that individuals with more 
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sophisticated mental models and more complete information are able to form more accurate 
predictions of the consequences of a devaluation, and that their self-reported well-being will 
therefore respond more strongly to the news of a devaluation. Against this background, we proceed 
by describing the quasi-experimental design.  
 
 
II. Quasi-Experimental Research Design 
Late in the afternoon on May 29, 2005, the Bank of Botswana—the country’s central bank—and 
Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Development Planning issued a press release stating that the 
national currency—the Pula—would be devaluated by 12 percent against a basket of international 
currencies, with effect from the following morning, May 30, 2005. The central bank’s decision to 
devaluate the Pula came as a shock to the general public, the business community, and currency 
markets in Botswana, as we will show in more detail below. Our research design exploits this 
sudden and unanticipated intervention to examine the effect of economic shocks on individuals’ 
subjective well-being. We are able to do so because, incidentally, the devaluation occurred during 
the period where the Afrobarometer—an independent research project conducting surveys of 
political and social issues in Africa—was interviewing a representative sample of citizens in 
Botswana.2 The chance occurrence of the devaluation two days into the survey demarcates the 
                                                 
2 The data are published as part of the third round of the Afrobarometer. Technical details on the sampling of 
respondents and the methodology of the survey are available on the Afrobarometer website http://afrobarometer.org/. 
See also Bratton et al. (2005) for descriptions of the Afrobarometer, and Mattes (2007) for a discussion of survey 
research in developing countries. 
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sample of respondents into a treatment group surveyed after the intervention and a control group 
surveyed immediately before the intervention.3  
The terms “natural” and “quasi” experiments are often used in an imprecise and 
interchangeable sense. However, we advertently refer to the Botswana devaluation as a quasi-
experiment and distinguish it from natural experiments. While a common feature of natural and 
quasi experiments is that an intervention generated by some force outside the control of the 
researcher assigns subjects into treatment and control groups (Meyer 1995; Robinson et al. 2009), 
the defining characteristic of natural experiments is that treatment assignment occurs in a random or 
‘as-if’ random way (Dunning 2008, 2012). However, as emphasized by Cook and Campbell (1979) 
and Achen (1986), what distinguishes quasi-experimental designs from natural and controlled 
experiments is that assignment to treatment is nonrandom, which means that the treatment and 
control groups are imbalanced—or nonequivalent—at the outset. This means that even a 
macroeconomic shock, for example, a surprise devaluation, may not be strictly exogenous because 
nonrandom treatment assignment may make treatment status correlated with other factors that affect 
the outcome. In a regression framework, nonrandom assignment to treatment may therefore imply 
that treatment status is not statistically independent of the error term—at least not unconditionally—
and that confounding is a potential challenge to a causal interpretation of the estimated treatment 
effect.  
 While the survey data we use are a random and representative sample of 1200 adult citizens 
in Botswana, the key source of nonrandom assignment to treatment and control is that the sampling 
of respondents before and after the devaluation is geographically imbalanced. Overall, 216 
                                                 
3 The survey started on May 28 and ended on June 12, 2005. Since the devaluation was announced late in the afternoon 
(17:00 hours) on May 29, no interviews started after the announcement of the devaluation (the final interview began at 
16:57 hours).  
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respondents—corresponding to 18 percent of the sample—were surveyed before the devaluation 
(the control group), while 984 respondents were surveyed after (the treatment group). However, 
pre-treatment respondents are predominantly from the capital of Botswana—Gaborone—and from 
urban areas more broadly. Specifically, 63 percent of the pre-treatment respondents were from 
Gaborone; 85 percent were from urban areas. In the two days following the devaluation, only 10 
percent of the respondents were from urban areas. Therefore, the treatment coincides with a shift in 
the sampling of respondents from urban to rural areas, which is also likely to correlate with 
respondents' evaluations of their living conditions and well-being. Part of the treatment effect might 
therefore be due to preexisting differences in subjective well-being between people in rural and 
urban areas, or may arise if, for example, more confident, optimistic, or resourceful individuals self-
select into cities and urban areas (cf. Cook and Campbell 1979; Achen 1986). 
 Despite this initial imbalance between the control group and the treatment group, there are at 
least two reasons to believe that we can plausibly mitigate the consequences of nonrandom 
assignment. First, since we can identify the source of nonrandom treatment assignment—
geographically imbalanced sampling—with relative precision, we can also go a long way towards 
making the treatment and control groups comparable by adjusting for the relevant covariates. As we 
explain in more detail below, we do so in a number of ways; most importantly by controlling for 
whether respondents live in urban or rural areas; by excluding respondents in the Gaborone area; 
and by zooming in on the discontinuity in the data generated by the devaluation. Second, since the 
imbalance between the pre- and post-treatment groups is a result of the fact that the Afrobarometer 
simply happened to conduct interviews mainly in Gaborone and urban areas prior to the 
devaluation, we can rule out other sources of nonrandom treatment assignment caused by the actors 
generating the data. First, it is highly implausible that the Afrobarometer’s timing of the survey was 
related to the central bank’s decision to devaluate in any way, or vice versa. Second—and more 
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importantly—there is little reason to believe that respondents could somehow sort or directly self-
select into treatment or control, since they did not have the information, incentive, or capacity to do 
so (cf. Dunning 2012: 236). Indeed, qualitative evidence suggests that people in Botswana did not 
have any prior information about the central bank’s decision to devaluate. For instance, media 
reports by the Mmegi (The Reporter)—an independent Botswana newspaper—and the BBC in the 
days following May 29, 2005, consistently refer to the devaluation as a “surprise” or “shock.” One 
report notes that the reduction of the value of the Pula “has taken consumers by surprise.”4 In 
another report, a woman being interviewed in the wake of the devaluation said that “this 
information should be disseminated while we can act. This was a pre-emptive action.” These 
statements clearly suggest that the central bank’s intervention was a surprise move to citizens. 
Indeed, even business actors in currency markets—who should, a priori, be among the most likely 
candidates to be well-informed about a monetary policy intervention—expressed great surprise at 
the news of the devaluation. For instance, a BBC report stated that “Botswana has surprised the 
currency market by devaluating the Pula by 12%.” On May 31, 2005—the day after the devaluation 
became effective—the Mmegi newspaper quoted a chief executive officer of Stockbrokers 
Botswana—a registered member of the Botswana Stock Exchange—for saying that “the move has 
taken the market by surprise, particularly the magnitude of the devaluation and the timing.”5 A few 
days later, Stockbrokers Botswana (2005) issued a briefing paper commenting on the devaluation. 
While the company acknowledged the potential benefits of the devaluation to import-competing 
domestic producers and export companies, for example, the mining industry, it also stated that “we 
take issue with the brute force of the devaluation. It may have been more appropriate to introduce 
                                                 
4 “Labour Slam ‘Surprise’ Pula Devaluation,” Mmegi, May 31, 2005. “Botswana Devalues the Pula,” BBC News, May 
31, 2005. :Consumers Shocked at Effect of Pula Devaluation,” Mmegi, May 31, 2005.   
5 ‘Devaluation Hits Low-Income Earners, Mmegi, June 6, 2005. 
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the new mechanism, explain it, and then take steps to devalue to the desired level in a more 
measured fashion. This would allow corporates and investors to plan for the adjustments and reduce 
the shock premium that the move will command. The danger is that where the market is shocked it 
will overreact…” (Stockbrokers Botswana 2005: 1).  
This qualitative evidence supports two important points: First, neither the devaluation nor its 
timing was anticipated by the general public, and not even by businesses operating in currency 
markets. In that sense, it was an “exogenous” economic shock to citizens and the outcome we study, 
subjective evaluations of well-being. Second, although citizens are able to self-select into categories 
(like living in an urban area) that are correlated with treatment assignment, neither respondents nor 
the Afrobarometer had information, incentive, or capacity to decide whether respondents were 
interviewed before or after the devaluation, making direct self-selection into treatment highly 
improbable. Rather, the currency devaluation by the Bank of Botswana was an event that 
demarcated the respondents of the Afrobarometer survey into two groups, not because of the 
knowledge or decisions of respondents, but simply by chance. In Appendix S1, we provide further 
tests of the equivalence of the treatment and control groups on socio-economic background 
variables. Appendix S2 and S3 also shows results from regression and matching for observations 
that are on common support on the propensity score. These results do not change the main 
conclusions below.   
 
III. Devaluation and Well-Being: Simple Pre- and Post-Treatment Comparisons 
To get a sense of the differences between pre- and post-treatment groups, this section shows the 
simple relationship between exposure to the devaluation and subjective well-being, as well as the 
development in food prices in the months surrounding the devaluation. The latter is important 
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because it illustrates the most plausible mechanism connecting the currency devaluation to 
individuals’ evaluations of well-being.  
As dependent variable, we use respondents’ answers to the following question: “In general, 
how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?” Answers are given on a scale 
consisting of the categories “very bad,” “fairly bad,” “neither,” “fairly good,” and “very good,” 
where high values denote good living conditions. While the literature often uses questions 
concerning “life satisfaction” (Deaton 2008, 2012; Bjørnskov et al. 2010; Kahneman and Deaton 
2010; Asadullah and Chaudhury 2012), the question we use asks respondents to evaluate their 
present living conditions on a scale from “very bad” to “very good,” which is clearly a constitutive 
feature of subjective well-being.6 We therefore use this question to measure subjective well-being.7  
                                                 
6 We note that although the wording is not identical to most surveys asking about the satisfaction with life as a whole, 
the two questions tend to produce quite similar results. Using the 2011 wave of the World Values Survey in Ghana, we 
note the similarity between the regular life satisfaction question and a question specifically on satisfaction with one’s 
financial situation. Less than 5 percent of respondents who declare themselves satisfied with their financial situation 
(rating it 8–10 on a 1–10 scale) declare themselves unsatisfied with their life as a whole. 
7 The Afrobarometer also contains a related question, asking respondents to evaluate their living conditions relative to 
other people. Replications using this variable—evaluations of relative living conditions—does not change our findings 
substantially or statistically. Detailed results are available upon request. We do not think the two variables are 
sufficiently distinct to treat them as alternative measures, partly because questions asking people to rate their situation 
relative to others may pick up absolute and not relative differences (Karadja et al. 2014), and partly because the two 
living conditions questions are asked immediately after each other, which may make responses quite similar. 
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Figure 1 shows a simple time-series plot of respondents’ average evaluations of their present living 
conditions (subjective well-being) for each day of the survey. Figure 2 shows a plot of the 
development in an index of food prices from July 2004 to September 2006, with the value of 
September 2006 indexed at 100 (Central Statistics Office 2008). The vertical lines indicate the 
timing of the devaluation. As is clearly visible in Figure 1, upon the devaluation of the Pula, there is 
an immediate and substantial drop in respondents’ average evaluations of living conditions in the 
magnitude of 0.16 on a scale from 0 to 1. Compared to individuals surveyed prior to the 
devaluation, the subjective well-being of people surveyed after the devaluation was much lower. 
The immediacy of this drop in well-being is important too, as prices are unlikely to have adjusted 
very much already on the first day after the devaluation. While there were media reports of upward 
re-pricing by retailers and a consequent “shock of skyrocketing prices”8 shortly after the 
devaluation, the price level of consumables did not fully adjust to its new equilibrium within the 
short period where the survey data were collected. As shown in Figure 2, food prices developed as 
expected in the months following the devaluation. While the food price index was relatively stable 
in the year preceding the devaluation, it increased dramatically in the year after the devaluation. 
This suggests that people’s reaction to the devaluation—the drop in their evaluations of subjective 
well-being shown in Figure 1—is in large part driven by (qualitatively correct) expectations about 
the effects of the devaluation. Indeed, while the price effect of the devaluation materialized over 
months, there are good reasons to believe that people in Botswana knew what to expect, because 16 
months earlier—in early February 2004—the Bank of Botswana also implemented a 7.5 percent 
devaluation of the Pula. While this did not make the May 2005 devaluation any less of a shock to 
people in Botswana, the prior experience with the consequences of a sizeable currency devaluation 
means that people may have rationally updated their expectations concerning the effects of the 
                                                 
8 “Consumers Shocked at Effect of Pula Devaluation,” Mmegi, May 31, 2005. 
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devaluation rapidly, even though the consequences of the May 2005 had not fully materialized at 
the time of the survey.  
Figure 2 illustrates a second important point, namely that the Pula devaluation increased the 
price of imported food products and consumables in general, making consumers the major losers of 
the devaluation. A likely causal mechanism linking the currency devaluation to subjective well-
being is therefore (expectations about) the development in prices, particularly the price level of food 
and consumables. During the time of the Afrobarometer survey in Botswana in late May and early 
June 2005, this was a very salient feature of the devaluation to the Batswana. In a report in the 
Mmegi newspaper, several people being interviewed who were employed in various low-wage jobs 
expressed concern at the consequences of the devaluation. A taxi driver reportedly stated that the 
expected price increases “…will have a devastating impact on our business and the economy at 
large.” In the same report, another employee is quoted for saying that “putting food on the table will 
empty wallets” and that “I am concerned and feel impoverished.” These examples suggest that 
people in Botswana had clear expectations about what consequences the devaluation would have for 
the price level of consumables and, therefore, for their own well-being. They also suggest that the 
expectations of increasing prices could be an important factor driving individuals’ feelings of being 
impoverished and are therefore the most likely causal mechanism linking the currency devaluation 
to the drop in subjective well-being we observe in Figure 1.  
Although the relationship between the Pula devaluation and subsequent drops in subjective 
well-being is clear in Figure 1, we can use pretreatment observations as approximate 
counterfactuals for post-treatment observations only on the assumption that the devaluation is a 
plausibly exogenous shock to the citizens of Botswana. Given the imbalanced sampling of the pre- 
and post-treatment groups, the plausibility of the exogeneity assumption of course requires that we 
successfully condition on relevant confounders, most importantly by adjusting for rural-urban 
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differences between the two groups as discussed above. However, as we show in the next section, 
neither the urban-rural shift nor a range of other potential confounders can fully account for the 
observed drop in subjective well-being following the devaluation. Detailed descriptions of all 
variables used in the econometric analyses along with summary statistics are available in Appendix 
S4.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
To estimate the effect of the currency devaluation on subjective well-being, our econometric 
analyses use models for continuous and categorical data. First, we treat the dependent variable as 
continuous by converting the categorical responses into a variable that assigns a number to each 
response. Following this strategy, we construct a variable, which holds the values 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 
and 1 corresponding to the five response categories and use this as our dependent variable in a 
series of linear regressions.9 As an alternative, we maintain the categorical nature of the data and 
estimate an ordered logit model, using the appropriate link function. In what follows, we report the 
coefficients of interest using both estimators to show that the results are qualitatively identical. Our 
starting point is the following linear regression model.  
  
(1)   yi= a + dTi +bXi + ei, 
 
where the dependent variable, yi, is respondent i’s evaluation of her present living conditions; Ti is 
the devaluation treatment indicator; and Xi is a vector of controls. The identifying assumption in (1) 
is that that T and e are orthogonal, Cov(T, e)=0,  conditional on X, where the most import element in 
                                                 
9 This effectively amounts to a rescaling of the numerical values assigned to each response in the Afrobarometer survey 
such that our variable runs in the interval from 0 to 1. 
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X is respondents’ rural-urban status. Throughout, standard errors are regionally clustered to allow 
for arbitrary correlation among respondents living in the same region. Table 1 shows the results.    
 
Main Results 
Panel A in Table 1 show results obtained using OLS regressions. Panel B shows the treatment 
coefficient from identical specifications obtained using ordered logit regressions. Throughout all 
models in Panel B, the ordered logits confirm the basic conclusion from the linear models of a 
negative association between the devaluation and respondents’ evaluations of their living 
conditions. Since the results are substantially similar, we comment only on the results in Panel A.  
Column (1) in Panel A shows the unconditional association between the treatment and 
respondents' evaluation of their living conditions. The point estimate of the treatment effect is 
negative and with a magnitude about 16 percentage points corresponds to the finding in Figure 1. 
The association is highly significant and corresponds to 60% of a standard deviation. In columns (2) 
and (3), respectively, we include an urban dummy and a capital (Gaborone) dummy. This serves to 
immediately alleviate concerns that our results are in fact driven by a shift in the sampling of 
respondents from urban (predominantly Gaborone) to rural areas. In column (2), the urban dummy 
barely changes the estimated association. In column (3), the Gaborone dummy does attenuate the 
association somewhat, but it remains sizeable and statistically significant. In the next section, we 
tackle the fundamental problem of nonrandom assignment in more depth. 
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Table 1. The Effect of the Devaluation on Perceived Living Conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Panel A: Least Squares Dependent variable: Subjective evaluation of living conditions 
            
Treatment -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.07*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.042) (0.059) (0.028) (0.030) (0.025) 
Botswana economic condition          0.11***  0.09*** 
         (0.012)  (0.013) 
Own past economic situation          0.08*** 0.05*** 
          (0.007) (0.008) 
Male dummy           -0.03* 
           (0.012) 
Urban dummy  0.05***         0.00 
  (0.022)         (0.015) 
Gaborone dummy   0.12***         
   (0.026)         
Poverty           0.25*** 
           (0.024) 
Age           -0.01* 
           (0.002) 
Age squared           0.00* 
           (0.000) 
Unemployment           -0.02* 
           (0.012) 
No children           0.02 
           (0.029) 
District fixed effects  No No No Yes No No No No No No No 
Tribal fixed effects No No No No Yes No No No No No No 
Occupational FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No 
Sample centred on discontinuity No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No 
            
Observations 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 375 216 1,152 1,188 1,109 
R-squared 0.053 0.061 0.061 0.105 0.105 0.113 0.070 0.068 0.267 0.150 0.362 
Panel B: Ordered logit            
Treatment -1.07*** -0.89*** -0.62*** -0.91*** -1.12*** -0.91*** -0.97*** -0.97*** -0.93*** -0.97*** -0.65*** 
 (0.206) (0.207) (0.167) (0.212) (0.202) (0.158) (0.230) (0.314) (0.174) (0.178) (0.195) 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in text. Treatment denotes the Pula devaluation. Days before devaluation are coded as 0; days after 
devaluations are coded as 1. All models contain a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. *** p < 
.01, ** p < .05, * p <.1. 
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In column (4) we proceed to include a full set of dummies for the geographical regions of Botswana 
registered by the Afrobarometer to remove as much idiosyncratic geographical variation as possible 
in how respondents evaluate their living conditions. The association drops marginally to 0.12 and 
remains negative and highly significant. In columns (5) and (6), we included fixed effects for 
respondents' tribal affiliation (column [5]), and for each of the 25 occupational categories available 
in the Afrobarometer survey (column [6]). In both cases, the association between the devaluation 
treatment and subjective well-being remains substantively and statistically significant.10  
In columns (7) and (8) we zoom in on the discontinuity in the data, i.e. the days immediately 
surrounding the devaluation. We do so to minimize the likelihood that some unobserved event 
occurring after—and close to—the treatment is confounding the results. In column (7), we focus on 
the four days surrounding the devaluation (two days before, two days after); in column (8) we focus 
on the first day before and the first day after the devaluation. This drastically reduces the sample 
size, but it does not change the main result: The size of the treatment coefficient is virtually 
unaffected as is its level of statistical significance. That is, zooming in on narrow bands around the 
discontinuity generated by the devaluation does not change the negative association between the 
devaluation treatment and subjective well-being.  
In column (9), we control for respondents' assessments of the country's economic 
conditions, since this could plausibly affect how they perceive their own living conditions by 
supplying a signal of the existence of an overarching macroeconomic problem. The treatment 
coefficient barely changes, however, and remains highly significant. In column (10), a control has 
been added for how respondents perceive their own past personal economic situation. This shows 
                                                 
10 In addition, we have experimented with categorizing particular occupations as export-exposed. However, we cannot 
know whether individuals within those occupations are indeed engaged in export activities or not. Furthermore, for any 
clear theoretical implication to hold, we would need to know whether the Marshall-Lerner condition holds in the short 
run for the particular occupation. As results are as mixed as the theoretical prerequisites, we refrain from showing them. 
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that even after removing the effect of respondents' past economic situation, there is a very sizable 
and significantly negative change in the perception of living conditions following the Pula 
devaluation.  
Finally, in column (11) both of these controls have been included together with the urban-
rural indicator variable, gender, age and age squared, as well as a measure of poverty.11 While this 
lowers the coefficient of interest to 0.08, it is still highly significant and substantive, corresponding 
to approximately a third of a standard deviation. Since these observable variables are unable to 
account for the negative effect of the devaluation, we do not suspect that equally important 
unobservables are driving the estimated effect.  
 
Tackling Nonrandom Treatment Assignment 
As mentioned above, there are systematic differences between pretreatment and post-treatment 
responses since the former group was predominantly from urban areas (particularly the capital, 
Gaborone). This provides reason for caution because the shift from urban to rural respondents could 
plausibly coincide with a drop in evaluations of living conditions if, for example, more confident or 
optimistic individuals self-select into urban areas. While we dealt with this issue above, this section 
provides further tests that tackle the issue of nonrandom treatment assignment in more detail. We do 
so in Table 2 chiefly by removing respondents from the Gaborone area and respondents from urban 
(or rural) areas in general from the sample.12  
                                                 
11 The poverty index is based on the work of Bratton et al. (2005) and measures poverty as respondents’ experience with 
lack of access to five basic types of household necessities: food, water, medicine, fuel to cook food, and cash income 
(Justesen and Bjørnskov 2014). The index comprises the sum of these five survey items. A principal component 
analysis show that all five items load onto the same component (alpha=0.74).  
12 A separate issue is that the treatment divides the sample between weekend and weekdays. If subjective evaluations 
were, for some reason, more positive during weekends, our results would be biased (Helliwell and Wang 2011). 
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Table 2. Robustness Tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Least Squares Dependent variable: Subjective evaluation of living conditions  
      
Treatment -0.09*** -0.09** -0.15*** -0.14** -0.13** 
 (0.028) (0.02) (0.024) (0.021) (0.44) 
      
Excluding Gaborone 
 
Yes Yes No No No 
Sample centered on 
discontinuity 
 
Excluding urban 
respondents 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
No 
 
 
No 
  
Excluding rural  
respondents 
Yes 
  
Observations 1,063 176 679 128 519 
R-squared 0.008 0.027 0.016 0.045 0.051 
Panel B: Ordered logit      
      
Treatment -0.63*** -0.64** -1.06*** -0.89*** -0.61* 
 (0.173) (0.091) (0.129) (0.114) (0.317) 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in text. Treatment denotes the Pula devaluation. Days 
before devaluation are coded as 0; days after devaluations are coded as 1. All models contain a constant term 
(not reported to save space). Robust standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p 
< .05, * p < .1. 
 
In column (1), we report the basic unconditional association after omitting all respondents from 
Gaborone, which reduces the sample from 1,198 to 1,063 respondents. In absolute terms, the 
coefficient is reduced from 0.16 to 0.09, but it remains highly significant and shows that the 
relationship between the currency treatment and subjective well-being cannot be accounted for by 
the presence of respondents from the Gaborone area in the pretreatment group. In column (2), we 
continue to exclude respondents from Gaborone but also zoom in on the two days surrounding the 
devaluation (the first day before; the first day after). This does not change the results substantially 
either.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
However, in further estimates (available upon request) we show that this is not the case in the present sample or the 
subsequent fourth round of the Afrobarometer survey in Botswana. 
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Column (3) shows the basic unconditional association, this time omitting all urban 
respondents. The familiar conclusion obtains also in a sample of rural respondents, which shows 
that our results are not driven by differences in evaluations of living conditions between urban and 
rural respondents. The model in column (4) again omits urban respondents and zooms in on the two 
days surrounding the devaluation, with little impact on the treatment effect. Column (5), finally, 
omits all rural respondents, focusing only on respondents from urban areas. This also leaves 
conclusions unchanged. For all model specifications, we find very similar results using ordered 
logit instead of OLS (as reported in Panel B).  
To further document that the effect of the devaluation on subjective well-being cannot be 
reduced to the shift in the sampling of respondents from Gaborone to rural areas, we have 
performed a series of placebo tests, repeating some of our analyses using data from Round 4 (2008) 
of the Afrobarometer. In these tests, we define a placebo treatment indicator as living outside 
Gaborone (or urban areas more generally). If our results were in fact driven by differences in 
evaluations of living conditions between respondents in the capital (or urban areas) and elsewhere, 
the coefficient on this placebo treatment indicator should be similar in size to the coefficient on the 
treatment indicator reported above. However, as we document in Appendix S5, across various 
model specifications the difference between Gaborone and the rest of Botswana is never more than 
0.07 in Round 4 of the survey. And in some cases it is both statistically and substantively 
indistinguishable from zero.13 With the Round 3 data we use here, in contrast, the coefficient of 
interest is consistently significant and negative, in the magnitude of −0.16. This provides additional 
confirmation that our results are not driven by nonrandom treatment assignment of survey 
                                                 
13 Identical results (both in terms of size and significance of coefficients) follow when we use the distinction between 
urban and rural rather than Gaborone as distinct from the rest of Botswana. We also checked whether there were 
significant differences between urban and rural areas by adding a rural-treatment interaction. As we found no 
indications of heterogeneity, we refrain from any further discussion. 
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respondents. We did similar placebo tests using as treatment the first two days of the survey from 
Round 4 (Appendix S5). This reveals that in Round 4 there was no discontinuity in respondents’ 
evaluations of living conditions after two days of surveying. 
 
Conditioning Effects of Information and Cognitive Sophistication 
So far we have documented a strong effect of the shock devaluation on subjective well-being. 
However, as mentioned earlier, there may be reason to expect that people with higher levels of 
information and cognitive sophistication display stronger and more immediate responses to the 
news of the devaluation. Specifically, individuals with more informed and sophisticated mental 
models of the economy may make more accurate predictions of the consequences of the devaluation 
and update their expectations about the future more rapidly. In Table 3 we examine whether the 
association between subjective well-being and the macroeconomic shock depends on respondents’ 
level of information and cognitive sophistication.  
To operationalize information we construct a dummy variable where we treat informed 
respondents as those who report getting daily news from the radio, television, or newspapers (coded 
1). News consumption must be on a daily basis to moderate the observed drop in subjective well-
being already on the day following the devaluation. If respondents do not follow the news on a daily 
basis, we treat them as uninformed (coded 0). As a proxy for cognitive sophistication, we use 
respondents’ level of education (see Appendix S4 for details).   
 
  
25 
 
Table 3. Information, Education, and the Effect of the Treatment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Least squares 
       
Treatment -0.08*** -0.05 -0.05* -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) 
Daily news consumption 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.13***    
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.015)    
Treatment-news interaction -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07**    
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023)    
Education    0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Treatment-education interaction    -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Urban dummy  0.03 0.02  0.02 0.02 
  (0.021) (0.019)  (0.020) (0.019) 
Own past economic situation   0.07***   0.07*** 
   (0.006)   (0.006) 
Occupational fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,196 1,196 1,186 1,194 1,194 1,184 
R-squared 0.083 0.135 0.211 0.103 0.133 0.205 
Panel B: Ordered logit       
       
Treatment -0.57*** -0.34* -0.37* -0.56*** -0.44*** -0.36* 
 (0.164) (0.203) (0.203) (0.157) (0.133) (0.189) 
Daily news consumption 1.11*** 1.03*** 0.97***    
 (0.082) (0.100) (0.101)    
Treatment-news interaction -0.54*** -0.56*** -0.48**    
 (0.174) (0.203) (0.193)    
Education    0.28*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 
    (0.022) (0.017) (0.038) 
Treatment-education interaction    -0.08** -0.08*** -0.09** 
    (0.035) (0.026) (0.044) 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in text. Treatment denotes the Pula devaluation. Days before devaluation are coded as 0; days after 
devaluations are coded as 1. All models contain a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. *** p < 
.01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 
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To examine whether information and cognitive sophistication condition the relationship between the 
currency devaluation and subjective well-being, we augment the regression model (1) with, first, an 
interaction of the treatment indicator and our measure of information and, second, an interaction of the 
treatment and education, our proxy for cognitive sophistication. Panel A in Table 3 shows results from 
linear regressions, while Panel B shows coefficients from identical ordered logit models. As in Tables 1 
and 2, across specifications the conclusion that follows from these models confirms the OLS models in 
Panel A.  
Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients in column (1) show that the association 
between the devaluation and subjective evaluations of living conditions is stronger if respondents are 
well informed. Thus, while the coefficient on the treatment indicator remains significantly negative at 
0.08, treated respondents with daily news consumption evaluate their living conditions to worsen by an 
additional and significant 0.08. Similar conclusions follow from the specifications in columns (2)–(3), 
where controls for urban residence, respondents’ perceptions of their past personal economic situation, 
and occupation fixed effects are added. This suggests that individuals with higher levels of information 
more quickly update their perceptions of well-being.14  
In columns (4)–(6), we interact the treatment indicator with respondents’ education. Here we 
find that higher levels of education strengthen the association between the treatment and respondents’ 
negative evaluations of their living conditions. We show this in Figure 3 by plotting the marginal effect 
of the currency treatment at different values of education (cf. Brambor et al. 2006) along with 90 
percent confidence intervals (indicated by the dotted lines). While the devaluation shock causes a drop 
                                                 
14 The devaluation might plausibly affect rich and poor individuals differentially. Within occupational groups, however, 
there are no signs of a heterogenous treatment effect between rich and poor (results available on request). 
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in subjective well-being even for people with no formal education (values of zero on the education 
variable), Figure 3 clearly shows that the negative effect increases and becomes more significant as 
respondents’ educational level increases.  
 
The conditioning effects of information and education are both intuitive. In order to understand the 
effect of a devaluation on (future) living conditions, people must be reasonably informed about the 
devaluation and have mental models that allow them to predict the future consequences of the 
devaluation. Even so, the fact that respondents who follow news on a daily basis give more negative 
responses following the devaluation need not reflect cognitive sophistication but can also reflect 
respondents’ ability to mimic and absorb the evaluation of experts reported in the news. However, 
higher levels of cognitive sophistications in the form of education also seem to strengthen the effect of 
the devaluation on respondents’ subjective well-being. This probably reflects both increased 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of treatment by educational levels
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consumption of daily news among this group of respondents and that education increases individuals’ 
knowledge about the future consequences of the devaluation and their consequent ability to form 
rational expectations. Overall, these results suggest that the devaluation shock did on average result in 
drops in subjective well-being for all citizens of Botswana, but that the negative effect is conditional in 
nature and larger for people with higher levels of information and education.  
 
V. Conclusions 
This article documents a strong and significantly negative effect of monetary shocks on subjective 
well-being. Using the case of a central bank devaluation in Botswana as a quasi-experiment, our results 
show that people’s subjective well-being dropped immediately after the news of the devaluation was 
released in the public. As we have documented, this result is extremely robust and persists even when 
plausible sources of nonrandom treatment assignment are dealt with. The results therefore provide 
robust evidence that monetary shocks in the form of unanticipated currency devaluations have a strong 
and negative causal effect on how people rate their living conditions and personal well-being.  
Moreover, people who are well informed through higher levels of news consumption and 
people with higher levels of education respond more strongly to the news of the devaluation. This 
suggests that the effect of monetary shocks on subjective well-being is conditional on individuals’ 
levels of information and cognitive sophistication and not merely an effect of real economic change in 
the very short run. Given the short time period for which we have data—the days in which the survey 
was conducted in Botswana—we cannot say anything about how quickly well-being might recover 
following an economic shock like the one we study. However, our results strongly suggest that 
macroeconomic shocks, such as unanticipated currency devaluations, may have significant short-term 
costs in the form of reductions in people’s sense of well-being. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix S1: Modelling nonrandom selection into treatment 
A potential worry in our design is that the control and treatment groups are dissimilar not only in terms 
of urban/rural difference but also on other relevant characteristics. While we discuss this in the main 
text, Table S1 provides an additional test of the extent to which the control and treatment groups are 
balanced. Specifically, in Table S1 we use treatment assignment as the dependent variable in a logit 
regression (treatment=1; control=0). The covariates used to test treatment-control imbalances are 
similar to those used in Table 1, plus education. This regression therefore specifies a selection equation 
(Robinson et al. 2009, 350) that enables us to examine potential differences between the treatment and 
control groups on a series of pre-determined socio-economic variables. The results in Table S1 show 
that there are few significant differences between the treatment and control groups. The data are 
somewhat imbalanced in terms of urban/rural differences, poverty (albeit only with p<0.1), and 
unemployment. However, in terms of gender, age, having children, education, and perceptions of the 
country’s and one’s own economic situation, there are no significant differences between the treatment 
and control groups. These results provide evidence in favor of the quasi-experimental nature of our 
design. 
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Table S1. Modelling selection into treatment  
Model (1) 
Dependent variable Treatment status 
  
Urban -2.13* 
 (1.149) 
Male 0.03 
 (0.041) 
Poverty -1.52* 
 (0.901) 
Age 0.01 
 (0.013) 
Age squared 0.00 
 (0.000) 
Unemployment 0.68** 
 (0.312) 
No children 0.49 
 (0.334) 
Education 0.01 
 (0.051) 
Botswana economic condition -0.14 
 (0.147) 
Own past economic situation -0.09 
 (0.079) 
Constant 3.80*** 
 (1.093) 
  
Observations 1,106 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in text. Dependent variable is treatment indicator: 
1=treated; 0=controls. Results obtained using logit regression. Coefficients are log(odds) with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix S2: Regressions with common support on the propensity score 
To further test the robustness of the results in Table 1, Table S2 replicates the results from Table 1 in 
regressions where only observations on common support are included. The results in Table S2 are 
obtained in two steps. In the first step, we use the logit model from Table S1 above to obtain propensity 
scores, i.e. the predicted probability of being treated, Pr(T=1)|X, given the covariates, X, in the model. 
The propensity score is used to define the interval of common support, i.e. the interval on the 
propensity score where there is overlap between observations in the treatment and control groups 
(Morgan and Winship 2007; Persson and Tabellini 2003). This ensures that for every treated 
observation, there are comparable observations in the control groups, which should increase the 
homogeneity of observations in the two groups (Ho et al. 2007). Specifically, we follow Persson and 
Tabellini (2003, 143) and define common support as the interval between the minimum propensity 
score (ps) for the treated (min T=1) and the maximum propensity score for the controls (max T=0). In 
our case, this interval is given by 0.375≤ps≤0.975. In the second step, we replicate the results from 
Table 1 in regressions that are restricted to observations on common support. Hence, in Table S2 
observations that are outside the interval of common support are discarded, meaning that the number of 
observations drop compared to Table 1. However, while the coefficients in Table S2 are slightly lower 
than in Table 1, the general pattern is similar and corroborates that the devaluation tends to decrease 
subjective assessments of well-being. 
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Table S2: Replication of Table 1: Observations on common support  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Dependent variable Subjective evaluation of living conditions 
            
Treatment -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.05* -0.03 -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.15** -0.09 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.07** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.025) (0.045) (0.038) (0.028) (0.043) (0.066) (0.030) (0.032) (0.025) 
Botswana economic condition         0.10***  0.09*** 
         (0.015)  (0.013) 
Own past economic situation          0.08*** 0.05*** 
          (0.011) (0.012) 
Male dummy           -0.03* 
           (0.015) 
Urban dummy  0.01         0.00 
  (0.022)         (0.020) 
Gaborone dummy   0.12***         
   (0.023)         
Poverty           0.30*** 
           (0.025) 
Age           -0.01** 
           (0.003) 
Age squared           0.00** 
           (0.000) 
Unemployment           -0.03** 
           (0.013) 
No children           0.03 
           (0.033) 
District fixed effects No No No Yes No No No No No No No 
Tribal fixed effects No No No No Yes No No No No No No 
Occupational FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No 
Sample centred on discontinuity No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No 
            
Observations 958 958 958 958 958 958 362 185 958 958 958 
R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.047 0.085 0.086 0.094 0.060 0.023 0.209 0.110 0.310 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in text. Treatment denotes the Pula devaluation. Days before devaluation are coded as 0; days after 
devaluations are coded as 1. All models contain a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust standard errors clustered at the region level in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix S3: Matching 
As a final test of the robustness of our results, Table S3 report results where we use nearest neighbor matching rather than the 
OLS estimator. Specifically, we use the nearest neighbor matching algorithm developed by Abadie et al. (2004). That is, every 
observation in the treatment group is matched to its closest twin in the control group, and based on these matched comparisons, 
the average treatment effect (for the treated) is calculated (cf. Justesen 2012). We use this algorithm to calculate the effect of the 
devaluation shock (models 1-3) and for observations on common support only (models 4-6). The covariates used for matching 
are those shown in Table S1. Models 1 and 4 use one matched control per treated observation; models 2 and 5 use two matches 
per treated observation; and models 3 and 6 use three matches per observation in the treatment group to calculate the treatment 
effect. However, regardless of the number of matched observations and whether we restrict the data to observations on or off 
common, the results are quite clear: The devaluation has a significantly negative effect on people’s subjective well-being.       
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Table S3. The Effect of the Devaluation on Perceived Living Conditions: Matching Estimates 
Model (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome variable Subjective evaluation of living conditions 
Treatment (ATT) 
 
-0.093*** 
(2.64) 
-.091*** 
(2.92) 
-0.089*** 
(3.53) 
-0.076** 
(2.22) 
-.0748*** 
(2.70) 
-0.073*** 
(2.87) 
       
Matches per observation 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Common support definition All observations All observations All observations min(T=1), 
max(T=0) 
min(T=1), 
max(T=0) 
min(T=1), 
max(T=0) 
Region of common support - - - 0.375≤ps 
≤0.975 
0.375≤ps 
≤0.975 
0.375≤ps 
≤0.975 
# Observations 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 
# Obs. on common support - - - 958 958 958 
       
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in text. Reported estimates are average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT), obtained using 
nearest-neighbour matching with the inverse of the sample variance as weighting matrix. Matching is done on covariates shown in Table A.4. Estimates are 
obtained in Stata 12 using the nnmatch command developed by Abadie et al. (2004). Matches per observation = number of matched controls per treated 
observation. Observations in control group are allowed to be matched to more than one observation in the treatment group (matching with replacement). 
Region of common support is defined as: 0.375≤pr≤0.975, where ps=propensity score. Absolute values of heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Appendix S4: Descriptive statistics 
Table S4. Variable descriptions and summary statistics 
Variables Survey question and variable 
coding  
Data source Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Treatment (currency 
devaluation)  
Indicator variable that takes the 
value 0 for survey responses before 
the devaluation (May 28 – May 29, 
2005) and 1 for survey responses 
after the devaluation (May 30 – 
June 9, 2005).  
Authors’ coding 0.82 0.38 0 1 1200 
Evaluation of living conditions 
(subjective well-being) 
Respondents’ evaluation of their 
own present living conditions.  
Question Q4B: In general, how 
would you describe: Your own 
present living conditions? 
Answers given in categories: ‘very 
bad’, ‘fairly bad‘, ‘neither‘, ‘fairly 
good‘, and ‘very good’. Coded 
categorically on scale from 0 to 1.  
Afrobarometer, round 3 0.34 0.27 0 1 1198 
Evaluation of living conditions 
II (subjective well-being) 
This variable is used for 
robustness tests. Results are 
reported in tables below in this 
appendix.  
Respondents’ evaluation of their 
own present living conditions.  
Question Q5: In general, how 
would you rate: Your living 
conditions compared to those other 
Batswana? 
Answers given in categories: 
‘much worse’, ‘worse‘, ‘same‘, 
‘better‘, and ‘much better’. Coded 
categorically on scale from 0 to 1.   
Afrobarometer, round 3 0.40 0.25 0 1 1172 
Urban or rural residence of 
respondent  
Urban or rural primary sampling 
unit (variable urbrur). Coded as 1 
for respondents in urban areas, and 
0 for respondents in rural areas. 
Answered by interviewer. 
Afrobarometer, round 3 0.43 0.50 0 1 1200 
Gaborone indicator Indicator variable coded as 1 if 
respondent resides in Gaborone 
area, and 0 otherwise.  
Afrobarometer, round 3 0.11 0.32 0 1 1200 
Region fixed effects Binary indicator variables for the 
15 geographical regions registered 
Afrobarometer, round 3 *
by the Afrobarometer in Botswana. 
Answered by interviewer. 
Tribal fixed effects Binary indicator variables for the 
23 tribal/ethnic groups registered 
by the Afrobarometer in Botswana. 
Question Q79: What is your tribe? 
You know, your ethnic or cultural 
group. 
Afrobarometer, round 3 * 
Occupational fixed effects Binary indicator variables for the 
25 occupational categories 
registered by the Afrobarometer in 
Botswana.  
Question Q95: What is your main 
occupation? 
Afrobarometer, round 3 * 
Evaluation of country’s present 
economic conditions 
Respondents’ evaluation of the 
country’s present economic 
conditions.  
Question Q4B: In general, how 
would you describe: Your own 
present economic conditions of this 
country?  
Answers given in categories: ‘very 
bad’, ‘fairly bad‘, ‘neither‘, ‘fairly 
good‘, and ‘very good’. Coded 
categorically on scale from 1 to 5.   
Afrobarometer, round 3 2.80 1.17 1 5 1153 
Evaluation of past living 
conditions  
Respondents’ evaluation of own 
living conditions compared to 12 
month ago.  
Question Q6B: Looking back, how 
do you rate the following compared 
to twelve months ago: Your living 
conditions? 
Answers given in categories: 
‘much worse’, ‘worse‘, ‘same‘, 
‘better‘, and ‘much better’.  Coded 
categorically on scale from 1 to 5.    
Afrobarometer, round 3 2.90 0.99 1 5 1190 
Gender Question Q101: Respondents 
gender. Q101. Binary (0-1), with 
1=male 
Afrobarometer, round 3 0.50 0.50 0 1 1200 
Poverty. Index based on following questions Afrobarometer, round 3 0.77 0.21 0 1 1179 
(Q8A-Q8E): Over the past year, 
how often, if ever, have you or 
anyone in your family gone 
without: a) Enough food to eat; b) 
enough clean water for home use; 
c) medicines or medical treatment;
d) enough fuel to cook your food;
e) a cash income?
Each question is answered on a 
five-point scale from ‘never’ to 
‘always’. The index is the sum of 
all five items recoded to scale from 
0–1, where high values indicate 
wealth/no poverty and low values 
indicate severe poverty (i.e. 
frequent or permanent lack of basic 
household necessities).  
Age Respondent’s age in years. 
Question Q1. How old are you? 
Afrobarometer, round 3 37.6 16.4 18 99 1187 
Age squared Square of variable Q1 Afrobarometer, round 3 1681.2 1572.2 324 9801 1187 
Education: Proxy for cognitive 
sophistication  
Question Q90: What is the highest 
level of education you have 
completed? 
Answers given on 10-point scale 
from 0 (no formal schooling) to 9 
(post-graduate degree). 
Afrobarometer, round 3 3.42 2.02 0 9 1196 
News consumption: Proxy for 
information 
Binary indicator variable based on 
questions Q15A-Q15C: How often 
do you get news from the following 
sources: Radio (Q15A); Televison 
(Q15B); Newspapers (Q15C)? 
Variable is coded as 1 (informed) if 
respondents get news from either 
the radio, television, or newspapers 
on a daily basis; and 0 otherwise.  
Afrobarometer, round 3 0.54 0.50 0 1 1198 
Source: Data sources are listed in table. * Summary statistics not reported due to large number of categories on region, tribal, and occupational fixed effects. 
Appendix S5: Placebo tests 
Table S5. Placebo tests using Gaborone as treatment indicator in Afrobarometer Round 4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Least Squares Dependent variable: Subjective evaluation of living conditions 
Gaborone dummy -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05 -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.02 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.031) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) 
Botswana economic situation 0.08*** 0.06*** 
(0.009) (0.008) 
Own past economic situation 0.06*** 0.03*** 
(0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.00*** 
(0.000) 
Age squared 0.00*** 
(0.000) 
Male dummy -0.01 
(0.017) 
Urban dummy -0.01 
(0.017) 
Poverty -0.42*** 
(0.025) 
Tribal fixed effects No Yes No No No No 
Interview day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,199 1,199 1,199 1,198 1,168 1,149 
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.27 
Panel B: Ordered Logit 
Gaborone dummy -0.47*** -0.50*** -0.39* -0.42*** -0.44*** 0.13 
(0.103) (0.088) (0.229) (0.101) (0.086) (0.064) 
Panel C: Least Squares 
Dummy for survey day 1-2 0.03 0.02 0.21*** 0.03 0.01 0.01 
(0.033) (0.023) (0.055) (0.031) (0.028) (0.015) 
Panel D: Ordered Logit 
Dummy for survey day 1-2 0.18 0.16 0.91** 0.17 0.02 0.05 
(0.226) (0.174) (0.383) (0.216) (0.211) (0.122) 
Source: Data are from the round 4 of the Afrobarometer. All models contain a constant term (not reported to save space). Robust 
standard errors clustered at the region level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
